Open-source MCP gateway · v2.39.2 · MIT

Every MCP tool call ends in a verdict.

Hangar is a policy enforcement plane for MCP: it pins every tool, holds risky calls for approval, and enforces egress policy. Runs on a laptop, a VM, or Kubernetes.

Deterministic — no ML. Self-hosted — no SaaS.

Read a verdict

Where Hangar sits

MCP client

Requests tools

MCP Hangar

Checks policy

MCP server

Runs tools

Tool calls pass through Hangar; calls allowed by policy can reach the server.

What you can do

Put policy between an agent and its tools

  • Pin the tool contract

    Refuse a call if a tool's description or schema changes after you approved it.

    See tool pinning
  • Require human approval

    Hold selected calls until a person approves or denies them.

    See approvals
  • Control server egress

    On Kubernetes, set where a server can connect and which tool calls can leave.

    See egress policy

01 · the path

How a call is decided

A tool call passes 13 gates, in an order core fixes, before it reaches your server. The first one that says no is the verdict. Nothing on the verdict path is scored or learned.

this config

config.yaml
mcp_servers:
  github:
    tools:
      allow_list: ["get_*", "list_*"]
      approval_list: ["create_issue"]

produces this record

What the config decides, call by call
timeverdictcall · reason
15:15:02allowgithub.get_issuetenant_id=acme
15:15:03allowgithub.list_issuestenant_id=acme
15:15:04holdgithub.create_issuegate=approval state=pending
15:15:07denygithub.delete_repositorygate=tool_access reason=tool_not_in_access_policy
15:15:11denygithub.list_issuesgate=tenant_budget reason=rate
Reads pass, the write waits for a person, anything else is never exposed, and a tenant over its rate is refused before anyone is asked.
Explore all 13 gates in order
  1. CancelledruntimeWas the batch cancelled before this call ran?cancelled
  2. TimeoutruntimeIs the batch's time budget already spent?batch_timeout
  3. RouteruntimeWhich server answers: this one, or a member of its group?server_not_found · no_available_member
  4. Tool accessIs this tool exposed to this caller at all?tool_not_in_access_policy
  5. WithdrawalHas the tool been withdrawn for this tenant?tool_withdrawn
  6. Digest pinIs the tool still the one you approved, byte for byte?digest_mismatch
  7. HealthruntimeIs the server failing often enough to stop sending it calls?circuit_open
  8. ValidatorsDo the interceptor validators pass? They fail closed.validator_denied
  9. Tenant budgetDoes the caller's tenant have a budget, a free slot, and rate left?no_budget · concurrency · rate
  10. ApprovalDoes a person have to say yes first? The call holds until they do.approval_denied · approval_timeout
  11. Cold startruntimeStart a stopped server once, however many calls are waiting.start_failed
  12. Pin, after startThe pin check a cold start made possible.digest_mismatch
  13. CancelledruntimeWas the batch cancelled while the server started?cancelled

then, and not gates

  • Rate limitHas this caller spent its command-bus budget?RateLimitExceeded
  • Egress policy (L7)Inside the invocation, just before any outbound I/O: may this call, with these arguments and headers, leave?l7_verdict=deny · l7_verdict=require_approval
  • Response sizeIs the result over the cap? It is cut, and the cut is marked, with a continuation to fetch the rest.truncated

Generated from _GATES in core v2.24.0. The path with the cluster plane around it is on the request path.

02 · the record

What you can prove afterwards

Every call is written down with the caller attached — allowed and denied alike. A verdict nobody can attribute proves nothing, so identity travels with the record rather than being reconstructed afterwards.

Audit trail
Each allow, deny and hold, with the caller, the tenant, the gate and the bounded reason. Codes only, never the text a gate was handed.
SIEM export
CEF, LEEF 2.0, JSON lines and RFC 5424 syslog, the same refusal fields in all four.
Traces
OTLP spans per call, a hangar.gate.decision event per gate, and hangar.refusal.gate on the call that stopped.

the refused delete_repository, as your SIEM receives it

JSON lines

{"timestamp": "2026-10-05T15:15:07.204000+00:00", "event_type": "ToolInvocationDenied", "provider_id": "github", "route_backend": "github", "tool_name": "delete_repository", "status": "denied", "duration_ms": 0.41, "user_id": "svc:ci", "session_id": "sess-4f1a", "tenant_id": "acme", "gate": "tool_access", "gate_reason": "tool_not_in_access_policy"}
View the same refusal as LEEF 2.0
LEEF:2.0|MCP Hangar|MCP Hangar|0.15.0|103|	devTime=Oct 05 2026 15:15:07	proto=tool	usrName=svc:ci	sessID=sess-4f1a	tenantID=acme	action=delete_repository	duration=0.41	gate=tool_access	gateReason=tool_not_in_access_policy	src=github	routeBackend=github
Written by core v2.24.0's own audit handler and exporters from one ToolCallRefused event, not typed for this page. Configure the exporters.